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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH
\VILLL\.1\I H. STEELE and
~lEL \'" 1\ R. STEELE,
PI ai n tiffs- Appellants~
vs.

DEN\'"ER & RIO GRANDE \VESTEH~
IL\ILROAD COMPANY
and \\'"EYHER CONSTRUCTION

Case No.
10063

CO~IPANY,

Defendants- Respondents~
and Cross Appellant.

Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellant

ST . .\TE)LEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants
for damages as the result of injuries received by each
of them when the pickup truck in which they were riding was struck by a train owned and operated by the
defendant Denyer & Rio Grande \Vestern Railroad
Company. Defendant \Yeyher Construction Company
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was constructing a concrete overpass at the scene of the
accident. The plaintiffs alleges that Weyher Construction Company was negligent in constructing an access
way to the railroad tracks where the overpass was being
constructed. This access way was used to gain access to
the railroad switch terminals located nearby and also
to move equipment of defendant W eyher Construction
Company so that the concrete overpass could be constructed.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits, photographic exhibits,
and the depositions of the plaintiffs showing that at the
time the accident occurred, the plaintiffs were aware
of the railroad crossing and yet drove upon the tracks
and stopped their pickup truck directly in the path
of an oncoming train that was so near to the pickup
truck that it could not stop in time to avoid the collision. ( R. 60) . The rna tter was argued to the lower
court at the pre-trial conference, the Honorable A. H.
Ellett presiding. Plaintiffs offered no counter affidavits
or other evidence in opposition to defendants' motions.
The trial court granted summary judgment against
plaintiff William H. Steele as to both defendants and
against Melva R. Steele as to defendant W eyher Construction Company but denied the railroad's motion for
summary judgment against Melva R. Steele. (R. 66).
The court then entered a pre-trial order setting forth
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the sole issue bet \\Ten plaintiff ~lelva R. Steele and
the railroad eon1pany. the issue being a determination
of' whether or not the railroad engineer gave a warning
si~nal hy whistle or bell as he approached the crossing.
(R. 7·~. Tr. I to 9}.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .APPEAL
Both defendants seek affirmance of that part of
the lower court's order granting summary judgment
against plaintiff \Villimn H. Steele and Melva R.
Steele. Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company further seeks reversal of the lower
court's order refusing to grant that defendant's motion
t'or summary judg1nent against Melva R. Steele.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order to promote clarity, the parties will be
referred to hereiu as plaintiffs and defendants.
Defendant \Y eyher Construction Company was
awarded a contract by the l_... tah State Road Commission
to erect a concrete overpass to carry vehicle traffic over
the railroad tracks of the defendant Denver & Rio
Grande \,. . estern Railroad Company. The fill dirt at
both ends of the overpass had been placed about two
years prior to the construction of the concrete overpass
and had been settling for this time. The fill dirt was
eyher Connot placed at the site of the overpass by
struction. Its contract was only for the erection of the

''r
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concrete overpass connecting the elevated earth filled
approaches to the tracks. (R. 62-63). On the morning
of October 19, 1961, the plaintiffs were intending to go
to a nursery east of the railroad tracks. They drove
upon the old roadway leading to the fill and overpass
that was being constructed. As they approached the
beginning of the fill, each of them saw that the road
had been barricaded with a fence and a sign was erected
in the center of the road stating "road closed". (Plaintiffs' depositions, 9 to 11, 39). Plaintiffs further saw
that men were working on the concrete overpass. It was
a clear sunny· morninfg and visibility was good. (Plaintiffs' depositions 12, 40 and 41). They noted that there
was an access way south of the fill running parallel with
the fill to the railroad tracks. In spite of the sign stating
that the road was closed, they drove around the fill
dirt on the south, the fill running approximately east
and west, and approached the railroad tracks. Mr.
Steele admitted that there were no signs indicating that
he should turn on to the access way or that this was a
detour. (Plaintiffs' depositions 10 & 11). He approached the railroad tracks with the windows on his
pickup truck rolled down. (Plaintiffs' deposition 12).
There was a sign near the tracks stating that the area
was private property and a railroad right of way, and
that trespas~ing was at person's own risk. (Exhibits 2,
3 & 4) . Just as Mr. Steele drove upon the tracks he
looked up toward the top of the overpass where the
men were working and made no observation for trains.
(Plaintiffs' depositions 15 & 1_7). Mrs. Steele suddenly
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exclaimed that they were directly in the path of the
train whieh was just a matter of a few feet from their
tru<.·k at that time. (Plaintiffs· depositions 14, 15, 41
and -t:!). The diesel engine struck the plaintiffs' pickup
truck awl carried it a short distance south of the point
of impact before casting it off to the west of the tracks.
Plaintiffs were thereafter removed to a hospital to be
treated for their injuries.

POIXTS

l.H<-~ED

FOR AFFIRMANCE

POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SC~L\L\.H\.. JUDG~IENT
AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF DEFEND.AXT\YE\THER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
JlTDG:\IENT AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF 'VILLIAl\I H. STEELE AND IN
FA \ .. OR OF DEFENDANT DENVER & RIO
(~IL\XDE \YESTERN RAILROAD.
SU~L\L\HY

POINT III
THE COlTRT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
PER:\IIT THE ...-\PPLICATIOX OF THE DOCTRIXE OF L.A.ST CLEAR CHANCE UNDER
THE F~-\CTS OF THE CASE.
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POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE DEFENDANT DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY
AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF MELVA R.
STEELE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF DEFEND,
ANTWEYHER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
Mr. Setele testified in his deposition that as he approached the overpass he noted that the road ahead
of him was barricaded and that there was a sign stating
"road closed". (Plaintiffs' deposition pages 10 and 11,
Appellant's brief, page 3). He then noted that about
100 feet west of the barricade and this sign, there
appeared to be a turnoff south of the road he was
traveling and turning to the east going along the south
side of the fill dirt. He proceeded to take this dirt
access way driving at about 15 or 20 miles an hour.
(Plaintiff's deposition, page 14). Just as he approached
the railroad tracks, he looked up to the top of the overpass to watch the men working. While watching the
men, he drove upon the railroad tracks. It was at this

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

moment that his wife shouted to hi1n to look and he
then saw the on-cmning train and the accident occurred.
(Plaintiff's <leposition 14 & 15). He admittedly did
not stop before driving on to the tracks. He said he
hadn't noticed the tracks as he was looking up at the
men working on top of the overpass as he approached
awl drove upon the track. He never looked to his left
or to his right before driving upon the track. (Plaintiff's
deposition, page 27). He admitted that had he stopped
within 10 feet of the railroad track, he would have had
visibility along the track in the direction from which
the train approached. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 28) .

In 1\Irs. Steele's deposition, she admits that there
was a sign stating "road closed". (Plaintiff's deposition,
page 39). After her husband had driven onto the access
way leading to the tracks, she requested that he turn
around and go back. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 39).
\Vhen they reached the railroad track, the train was
right upon them and the impact took place. Defendant's
counsel asked her if she suggested to her husband that
he stop before he got onto the track and she replied:
.. ,yell. I thought he knew. He had always
took precautions before." (Plaintiff's deposition
Page 42).
She admitted that before they got to the tracks she

could see the tracks. 'Yhen asked why she wanted her
husband to turn around and go back she answered:
'''Yell, I guess the obstructed view ... you
just couldn't see from the north ... I imagine
that is the reason I said, 'Let's go back.' "
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She was then asked:
"I say, is that the reason you suggested you
turn around, because you couldn't see to the
north?"
ANSWER: "I imagine it would. A woman
always has an intuition. You can't tell why she
has it or how she has it, it is just there."
QUESTION: "You were concerned about a
train maybe coming from the north?"
ANSWER: "Couldn't hear one; I never heard
no whistles or anything."
QUESTION: "I say, is that the reason you
suggested you turn around, because you couldn't
see to the north?"
ANSWER: "I imagine it would." (Plaintiff's
deposition Pages 42 and 43).
Mrs. Steele said that the train was coming under the
viaduct as her husband drove upon the track. She was
again asked in her deposition:
"you saw the tracks before you got to them, I
assume."
ANSWER: "Yes."
QUESTION: "And you knew the tracks
were there, I assume."
ANSWER: "Yes, I think that is why I suggested, 'Bill, turn around and go back.' " (Plaintiff's deposition Page 51).
The affidavit of Maurice Anderson, project engineer for the State of Utah on the site in question, was
filed wherein Mr. Anderson testified that the fill dirt
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constituting the approach to the overpass was placed
in the area by a contractor other than defendant Weyher
Construction Company and that the road had been
closed pursuant to his order. A barricade in the form
of a wire fence was placed across the roadway with a
sign stating "ROAD CLOSED". (R. 62). Interrogatories were submitted to the plaintiffs wherein they were
asked:
"Did the driver of the truck, William H.
Steele, look to his left and to his right before
driving onto the railroad tracks?"
ANSWER: "No". (R. 55).
Plaintiffs state in their brief that they heard the
train when they were about ten feet from the railroad
tracks but "this warning came too late ... " (Appellants' Brief, Page 3). They concede that the access
way leading to the railroad tracks was a private way
meant only for the use of the defendants. Both plaintiffs were trespassers. (Brief Page 4). The rights and
duties of the parties should be measured accordingly.
Plaintiffs make every effort to characterize the scene
of the accident as a hidden or dangerous trap. Mrs.
Steele admonished her husband to turn around and go
back because of her fear of the very danger that existed.
She admitted telling him to turn back because she
thought a train might be coming and the view to the
north was somewhat obstructed. (Plaintiff's deposition,
Pages 42. 43 & 51). Her fears proved to be well founded. The tracks were not hidden, nor were they dangerous if due care had been exercised. To the contrary,
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the danger if any, was open and obvious and was known
to Mrs. Steele, who brought it to her husband's attention. (See photo Exhibits 1 to 4) . They try to excuse
their negligence by claiming an obstructed view to the
north created by the fill dirt constituting the approach
to the overpass yet would burden the engineer operating
the train with the duty of seeing through the fill and
being aware of their unauthorized approach to the
tracks. Plaintiffs admit that their view was obstructed
until they were within ten feet of the tracks. They also
admit that the truck in which they were riding did not
stop as they approached the track but continued on to
the tracks and the impact then occurred. It is selfevident that if they could not see the train until they
were close to the tracks, the engineer of the train was
under the same disability until he was so close to the
truck that he would have absolutely no opportunity
or human ability to stop the train in time to avoid the
collision.
Plaintiffs further attempt to place themselves in
the legal relationship of invitees or licensees. By their
own admission they were driving upon a private access
way and the signs had warned them that the road was
closed. They became trespassers and the duty owed to
them was the duty owed to any other trespasser.
In their brief, plaintiffs cite several cases and text
authorities in an effort to support their theory that
certain duties a.nd obligations are owed to invitees. It
is respectfully submitted that none of the texts cited
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or eases referred to apply to the instant situation. The
citations refer to cases invoh·ing business invitees or
persons coming upon the property by implied invitation
for the benefit of the owner. Plaintiffs were trespassers
and therefore the authorities cited by the plaintiffs do
not apply.
Plaintiff's fail to strengthen their position by these
t·ontentions as the cases cited clearly show that before
a given condition can be construed as being a trap, it
must be shown that it could not be discovered by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. The testimony of Mrs.
Steele clearly demonstrates that she was fully aware
of the existence of the tracks and the possibility that
a train might very well be approaching from the north.
Had her husband, who was driving the pickup truck,
exercised his own powers of observation, he too would
ha,·e been aware of the tracks. He certainly cannot be
heard to say that he did not or could not see what was
clearly obYious and was there to be seen.
Reasonable minds could not differ in concluding,
as did the lower court, that the plaintiffs were trespassers
upon the railroad tracks. ~Irs. Steele admittedly knew
of the tracks and asked her husband to return to the
highway for fear of the very accident that occurred.
)lr. Steele, in proceeding to drive upon the railroad
tracks without first looking for a train, was the sole
cause of the accident. The defendant
eyher Construction Cmnpany did not owe to the plaintiffs any duty
greater than it owed to any other trespasser. No breach
of duty can be shown.

''T
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POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF WILLIAM H. STEELE AND IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DENVER & RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD.
For the reasons set forth in Point I, the court acted
properly in granting judgment against plaintiff William H. Steele and in favor of the railroad. In the case
of Abdulkadir vs. The Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2nd 53, 318 P. 2nd 339, at page 56, this
learned court said:
"It is a rule universally recognized, and settled
beyond question in this jurisdiction, that the
duty of care requires one entering upon a railroad track to use every reasonable opportunity
to look and listen for approaching trains and to
exercise caution to avoid being struck. Where
the physical facts and circumstances are such
that he could, by looking or listening, have seen
or heard the approach of the train, he cannot be
heard to say that he looked and listened, yet
did not see or hear it. Under such circumstances
it is but natural to presume that the traveler
either did not look or listen_, or that he failed to
heed what he perceived_, and such conduct 'Will
generally impute contributory negligence as a
matter of law. Plaintiff does not disagree with
the above rule but seeks to bring this case within those exceptions where there are obstructions,
distractions, or other extenuating circumstances
which may obstruct the traveler's view, or engage
his attention, or lead him to rely on safety, or
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otherwise tend to prevent or excuse him from discovering an approaching train." (Italics ours}.
This l'ourt in l'onsidt·ring the defense set forth by the
plaintiff therein to excuse his actions further said:
"Even if the light on the train might have been
confused with lights on the highway at some distance, as close as the train must necessarily
have been to these travelers when they stopped
upon the tracks, it obviously would have been
distinguishable had they looked. If we assume,
as plaintiff suggests, that there was no light on
the train until the instant before impact, such
an object as a train_~oming to.ward them on the
tracks would certainly not be invisible, nor
noiseless. The testimony that even though they
'lccre observing for trains they neither saw nor
heard one is too incredible to be accepted and
comes squarely within the rule that one cannot
be heard to say that he looked and listened_, yet
did Mt see or hear ~_hat was there plainly to be
observed."'"' (Italics ours) .
The instant case is one in which the facts clearly show
that ~lr. and 1\Irs. Steele cannot be heard to say that
they looked and listened yet did not see or hear what
was plainly there to be observed.
In the case of Gregory vs. Denver & Rio Grande
\Vestern Railroad Company, 8 Ut. 2nd 114, 329 P. 2nd
407, wherein the plaintiff's husband drove upon a crossing of several railroad tracks and, not observing a watchman or flagman that he said was usually there, continued to drive across the tracks and was struck before
clearing all of the tracks, this court said at page 117:
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"The plaintiff's own witness testified that from
the point where the driver of plaintiff's automobile entered the crossing, the track upon which
the collision occurred was visible for a distance
of one-quarter to one-half mile to the north."
The court then affirmed the trial court's granting of a
directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Crockett stated:
"There was no reason why he could not have
seen the train which was coming from the north.
Under the old and well established rule, this
impails him upon the horns of a dilemma. He
either failed to look or he looked and failed to
heed."
In the same case and in a separate concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Wade further said:
"I concur with the result because I think the
failure of the driver of the automobile to look to
see if a train was coming 'W{l8 the sole proximate
cause of the accident.-'-' (Italics ours).
In our instant case, the evidence clearly shows that
the fill dirt placed in the area was not placed there by
the railroad and it certainly should not be charged with
creating a hazardous condition over which it had no
control.
In the case of Benson vs. The Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, 4 Ut. 2nd 38, 238, P.
2nd 790, this court stated:
"In both these cases the confusing situation
creating a hazard was caused by the railroad
company rather than by outside agents. The
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plaintiff' has not cited an.IJ cases in which the
court has luld contributory negligence to be outaide the ycncral rule 'lehcn the hazard affecting
vi.vihility 'll'as not ceused or at least partially
cuuscd hy the railroad company itself.
"l~'1•cn if the railroad company is the cause of
the hazard, the travelers are not absolved from
the dcyrce of care required of ordinary~ reasonable and prudent men. The court in the Pippy
case, supra, at Page 451 of 79 Utah, at Page 310
of 11 P. 2wl said: 'the conflict however, does

not go to the proposition that under complicated
conditions the traveler is relieved from looking
and listening for the approach of trains, or from
exercising due care and vigilance to avoid injury.
That is his duty at all times and on all occasions
in approaching a railroad erasing and in driving
over it, •whether the view is obstructed or unobstructed~ and the greater the hazard or danger
surrounding him~ the greater is the care required
of him.n (Italics ours).

It is clear from the record that the sole cause of
the plaintiffs' injuries was the failure of Mr. Steele
to take proper precautions before driving upon the railroad tracks. Had he looked he surely would have seen
the approachig train. The exhibits demonstrate, and
the plaintiffs ad1nit, that there was an opportunity for
them to haYe seen the train before driving upon the
tracks. )Irs. Steele did not suggest that Mr. Steele
stop before he got to the tracks as she said:
"\Yell, I thought he knew. He had always
took precautions before." (Plaintiff's deposition, Page 42) .
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Accordingly, we respectfully repeat that the lower
court properly granted a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad and against the plaintiff William H. Steele, and
its judgment should be affirmed in that respect.

POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
PERMIT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE UNDER
THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
Counsel for plaintiff William H. Steele argues in
Point II of his brief that the Doctrine of Last Chance
operated to give this plaintiff an opportunity to carry
his care to a jury. The facts are clear. The testimony
of both the plaintiffs demonstrates that at the time they
drove upon the railroad tracks the locomotive was in
immediate and close proximity to them and it was just
a matter of seconds before the impact occurred. Their
depositions show that when their automobile was driven
into a position of peril on the tracks, it would have been
impossible for the locomotive to stop to avoid the collision.
The case of Lawrence vs. Hamburger Railroad
Company, 3 Ut. 2nd 247, 282 P. 2nd 335, and cited by
the plaintiffs, points out the problem of stopping a train
when the court stated:
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"The motorman or engineer operating a train
may assume, and act in reliance on the assumption that a person on or approaching a crossing is
in possession of his natural faculties and aware of
the situation, including the fact that a train
is a large and cumbersome instrumentality which
is difficult to stop, and that the person will
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for his own safety."
In the instant case, the plaintiffs by their own
testimony readily admit that the fill dirt constituting
the approach to the overpass completely blocked any
view they had to the north, the direction from which the
train was coming. If they couldn't see, obviously, the
engineer was under the same disability.
Counsel then cites the Lawrence case, supra, as
holding that when someone approaching a track is under
a disability the railroad engineer has a greater duty to
exercise due care. Counsel misapplies this court's holding in that case. It seems cle~r from the court's opinion
that the disability being referred to was that of someone
with an obvious limitation or disability such as children,
blind persons, persons in perhaps wheelchairs or walking
with crutches. or obviously very aged, etc.
In the case of Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Ut. 2nd 25,
361 P. 2nd 516, this learned court in discussing the doctrine of last chance, said:
"However, the doctrine of last clear chance
contemplates a last clear chance, not a last possible chance. The doctrine implies thought,
appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of
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sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse
to save another from injury."
In the case of Fox vs. Taylor, 10 Ut. 2nd 17 4, 350
P. 2nd 154, this court stated:

'"'"Where the defendant does not actually lcnow
of the plaintiff,s situation of peril, the doctrine
can only properly be applied where the plaintiff
has gotten into a position of inextricable peril.
An illustration of this is where a person has
caught his foot in a railroad switch, or is in some
other similar predicament, so that he is thereafter unable to avert the injury. In such a situation, the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest.
In such circumstances the defendant may be held
responsible. if he either knows, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should know, of the plaintiff's
helpless situation in #me to avoid the injury and
fails to do so.,, (Italics ours).
This court then pointed out that where a pedestrian
walked into the path of an oncoming car, the doctrine
of last clear chance would not apply. The court further
said:
"She was either in inextricable peril or she
was not. If she was not in inextricable peril,
then at any instant up to the time she got into
such predicament, by the exercise of reasonable
care, she could have observed the oncoming car
and have avoided being hit. On the other hand,
she could only have gotten into inextricable
peril by getting into the path of the defendant's
car, and her peril could be considered inextricable only if the defendant was then too close
to avoid striking her. Thus, by the very description of the situatiion, he did not have the 'last
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clear chance' to avoid the injury. As the phrase
indicates, it 1nust be a fair and clear opportunity
aud not a mere possibility that the collision could
lun·c been a'l.'oided. It is our conclusion that the
trial court was correct in refusing to submit the
case upon the doctrine of last clear chance."
(Italics ours) .
The facts in the instant case, as testified to by the plaintiffs, clearly show that the defendant's locomotive was
so close to the plaintiffs at the time they drove upon
the tracks, that the engineer had no possible opportunity of avoiding the collision. The doctrine of last
cleur chance therefore does not apply and we respectfully submit has no application under this factual
situation.

POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL
THE COlTRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
t~IL\XT st:~r~LARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE DENYER & RIO GRANDE WESTEHX RAILROAD COl\tiP ANY AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFF l\IEL YA R. STEELE ON THE
ISSI'"E OF THIS DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO
SOCXD .A. 'YARNING SIGNAL OR HORN.
As has been previously said, the access way that
the plaintiffs were driving upon was a private way,
hy their own admission in their brief at page 4. The
duty of the railroad engineer to sound his horn could
only arise at a time when he knew or should have known
that the plaintiffs were entering upon or about to enter
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upon the railroad tracks. The plaintiffs were trespassers
and the railroad engineer owed no duty to them under
this factual situation. This was not a railroad crossing.
By their testimony they admit that neither could see
each other until they were a matter of 10 feet from
the tracks. (Plaintiff's deposition, Page 28). They
were driving about 10 or 15 miles per hour. The train
was approaching at such close proximity that the impact
occurred in a matter of a second or two after they drove
upon the tracks. The engineer could only have been
aware of the approaching truck when it reached a point
approximately 10 feet from the tracks. At this time,
the plaintiffs were not in a position of inextricable peril
but could have stopped before driving upon the tracks
unless they were driving too fast for existing conditions. As they continued to approach and drive upon the
tracks, the engineer of the train was then so close that
he could not avoid the impact as it occurred almost the
instant they drove upon the tracks. (Plaintiffs' depositions, Pages 14, 15, 41 and 42).
On Page 3 of the appellants' brief, they say:
"The first warning the plaintiffs had that they
were in danger was at a point about 10 feet from
the railroad tracks when they heard a noise and
looked up and saw the train about to strike their
pickup. This warning came too late and the train
collided with the pickup . . . "
By their admissions they heard a warning before driving
upon the tracks. It was not the warning that came too
late but the inattentiveness of the plaintiffs that caused
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the accident. Their own negligence in failing to drive
more slowly and to keep a reasonable lookout for the
train before entering upon the tracks was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
\ Ve respectfully submit that the lower court should
have granted defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company's motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is our position that the lower
court properly granted summary judgment with respect
to the n1atters set forth in respondent's Points I, II,
and Ill, and that the same should be affirmed. We feel
the lower court erred in refusing to grant a summary
judgment on the issue of the sounding of a warning by
the defendant railroad company and its ruling should
be reversed and summary judgment entered, as a matter
of law, in favor of the defendant Denver & Rio Grande
\Vestern Railroad Company and against the plaintiff
Melva R. Steele.
Plaintiffs have cited several cases in their brief
which have not been referred to by defendants as they
are not in point with the questions involved on this
appeal. Reference thereto would necessarily enlarge
the defendant's brief and unnecessarily burden this
court.
It is further respectfully submitted by the defendants that plaintiffs' brief is silent as to any reference
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to the record in support of plaintiffs' statements. In
answering plaintiffs' brief, defendants have made references to the record on the points raised by the plaintiffs
which should properly draw the court's attention to the
Issues.
This court has clearly stated its position as to when
summary judgment should be granted by saying:
"We are in accord with the idea that the right
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded. This, of course, does not go so far as
to require the submission to a jury of issues of
fact m~rely because they are disputed. If they
would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff
could recover, no m~t.ter how they were resolved,
it would be useless ~~ consume time, effort and
expense in trying them, the saving of which is
the very purpose of summary judgment procedure."
See Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company, supra, at Page 55.
In conclusion, may we quote this court's findings in
the Benson case, supra, which we deem applicable in
our instant case, wherein this court said at Page 44:
"We believe that all reasonable men would
agree that if plaintiff had looked, he could have
seen the approaching train in time to stop and
avoid the collision, unless he was traveling too
fast under the existing conditions to do so.n
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Respectfully submitted,
F. ROBERT BAYLE and
\VALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR
1105 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents and
Cross-Appellant
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